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Abstract. This paper studies a model of disease propagation in which
individuals can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive
behavior. Individuals are fully rational, strategically sophisticated and forward-
looking. Equilibrium outcomes under decentralized decision making are charac-
terized and contrasted to the outcomes chosen by a benevolent social planner. In
general, individuals over-expose themselves to infection, leading to suboptimally
high disease prevalence. The model is applied to study the welfare effects of pre-
exposure prophylaxis, which reduces transmission between serodiscordant couples
and causes disinhibition. It is shown that a decrease in the induced infection risks
increases disease prevalence and can lead to decreases in overall welfare.
JEL Classification: C73, I18.
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1. Introduction
Historically, infectious diseases have posed a major obstacle to human wellbeing, caus-
ing both morbidity and mortality to human populations. Despite significant progress in
understanding diseases and developing medicines to combat their spread, epidemic out-
breaks continue to be an issue of first order importance for public policy. The recent
introduction of pre-exposure prophylaxis, such as the drug Truvada, has been lauded as a
“game changer”. Such drugs decrease the probability that infection is transmitted during
an unprotected encounter and have raised expectations that it may radically alter the
calculus of HIV control.1
Regrettably, there is a considerable lack of clarity about both the likely effects and
the desirability of such medical innovations and the issue of so-called risk compensation
remains controversial. Risk compensation, or disinhibition, is said to occur if a decision
maker responds to decreased risk by engaging in more risky behavior.
In this paper, I consider second-best interventions such as pre-exposure prophylaxis
and their relation to disinhibition in a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) type model.
My analysis contributes to this important policy debate by addressing the following two
fundamental questions: Does the introduction of pre-exposure prophylaxis to the unin-
fected (i) cause disinhibition? and/or (ii) decrease social welfare?
To preview the answer to the first question, my analysis confirms that a permanent
decrease in the infectiousness of the disease will prompt an increase in exposure and in
steady state disease prevalence. The reason is that such a change alters the tradeoffs
faced by decision makers in favour of increased exposure. Although the decrease in infec-
tiousness decreases the rate of transmission per exposure, the exposure itself increases so
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1See e.g. The Guardian, August 2, 2016: Judge to rule on NHS funding for ‘game-changing’HIV
treatment and BBC, February 25, 2015: Analysis: An HIV ’game changer’?
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much that the net effect is to increase disease incidence. This outcome is not pathological
and holds both for a utilitarian social planner and for self-interested individuals.
To preview the answer to the second question, my analysis shows that a decrease in the
infectiousness of the disease may indeed lead to a decrease in social welfare under certain
conditions. The reason is that individuals make different choices than those preferred
by a social planner. There are two sources for this discrepancy. First, there is a pure
externality effect that arises because individuals do not internalize the benefits to others
that flow from the individual protecting itself. As a consequence, aggregate equilibrium
protection is too low, thus causing higher future disease prevalence. This means that
the equilibrium future path of infection faced by the individual is higher than the path
preferred (and indeed chosen) by a social planner. But since each individual takes the
path of aggregate infection as given, this means that the individual and the planner
face different future paths of infection and this causes a second discrepancy between the
optimal choices and the equilibrium choices. This further drives a wedge between optimal
and equilibrium infection paths. This second effect stems from the fact that each (small)
individual takes aggregate disease prevalence as given.
These effects mean that the introduction of pre-exposure prophylaxis may well lead to
a decrease in social welfare. That this possibility can materialize is verified numerically.
These findings point to two central policy conclusions. First, the customary focus on
disinhibition in the policy debate is misplaced. When one decreases the infectiousness of
a disease, it may be perfectly desirable that individuals increase exposure and hence cause
disease prevalence to rise. After all, to the extent that individuals derive utility from such
exposure, it is right that policy should take that into account when trading off the costs
and benefits of such exposure. Second, the presence of external effects may lead policy
interventions to have undesirable consequences. In particular, a well-intentioned second-
best policy to reduce infections may in fact exacerbate the problem of over-exposure and
lead to socially inferior outcomes.
The present work contributes to a growing literature that studies the effects and
desirability of permanently decreasing the infectiousness of diseases through medical in-
novations. Lakdawalla et al. (2006) consider the effects of simultaneously introducing
antiretroviral therapy to susceptible and infected individuals in a susceptible-infected (SI)
type model. They note that there are several confounding effects. Ceteris paribus, the
susceptible individuals may benefit, because the introduction of antiretrovirals effectively
reduces the probability of transmission per risky sexual act. On the other hand, anti-
retrovirals increase the survival probability of infected individuals, thereby increasing the
source of infection. Unfortunately, Lakdawalla et al. (2006) do not distinguish between
equilibrium outcomes and socially optimal outcomes and it is therefore not a priori clear
from their work that policy interventions are warranted in the first place.2 Chan et al.
(2018) consider the effects of introducing antiretroviral therapy to susceptible individuals
and conclude that they are likely to benefit from reduced infectivity. Gersovitz (2010)
considers innovation in an infection context, but mainly offers results for technological
improvements that do not interact directly with individual’s decisions. The technological
improvements he considers cannot be interpreted as pre-exposure prophylaxis and his
analysis is therefore not directly comparable to that in this paper. Last, Tamalas and
2A consequence of the analysis in the present paper is that when no recovery is possible, i.e. in a
standard SI model, equilibrium is socially optimal unless the population is heterogeneous.
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Vohra (2018) consider the effects if imperfect protection in a network-theoretic model
of partner choice and show that a decrease in infectiousness can cause welfare-reducing
changes in partnership formation.
Disinhibition and related offsetting effects have been noted in several different con-
texts. In energy and conservation economics, the so-called rebound effect has been recog-
nized as a real possibility (see Gillingham et al., 2015 for a review of this literature).
The rebound effect is said to be present if an innovation that is intended to reduce the
use of a resource instead acts to increase the use of said resource. The rebound effect
is also known as the Peltzman effect, articulated in the context of safety equipment and
driving (see Peltzman, 1975 and Hoy and Polborn, 2015 for a more general and abstract
treatment). In traffi c and network economics, the “fundamental law of road congestion”
posits that an improvement of a road network may lead to increased congestion (Du-
ranton and Turner, 2011). In the context of protection against infectious diseases, such
effects are known as disinhibition. Interestingly, an almost universal feature of papers on
disinhibition focus on whether the effect is present and do not deal with the welfare con-
sequences of such effects (see e.g. Kremer, 1996, Richens et al., 2000 and Blumenthal and
Haubrich, 2014). Notable exceptions are Chan and Gillingham (2015), who analyze the
welfare consequences of the rebound effect in a static model of energy use and Hoy and
Polborn (2015), who analyze the effects of innovations and externalities in an abstract,
static two-player game.3
The formal framework of my analysis is that of an economic epidemiology model
with disease prevention.4 There is a relatively large and growing literature on the effects
and desirability of preventive measures such as quarantines, prophylaxis, vaccines and
promiscuity/abstinence. Main contributions include Sethi (1978), Geoffard and Philip-
son (1996), Kremer (1996), Auld (2003), Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), Aadland et al.
(2013), Francis (2004), Reluga (2009, 2010). Chen and Toxvaerd (2014) surveys the large
literature on the economics of vaccination. Although many of these papers study in-
terventions that fall under the broad category of “preventive measures”that may seem
superficially similar, there are important differences between them in terms of predictions
and policy recommendations.
Last, this paper departs frommost of the existing literature in another respect, namely
in its comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of the disease. It is diffi cult to analyze fully
dynamic models of disease propagation analytically and it is therefore common to focus
the analysis on the steady state(s) of such systems. Papers that take this route include
Kremer (1996), Barrett (2003), Kremer and Snyder (2003), Auld (2003), Lakdawalla et
al. (2006), Greenwood et al. (2013), Cerdeiro (2017) and Bate et al. (2016). No doubt,
the steady state(s) of a dynamic system are important, but to focus exclusively on steady
states can lead to misleading policy conclusions.
In Section 2, I set out the classical and economic models and summarize the classical
results. In Section 3, I analyze the problem of a benevolent central planner. In Section 4, I
analyze the equilibrium under non-cooperative decentralized decision making. In Section
5, I discuss welfare, derive comparative statics results and draw policy conclusions. In
3Duranton and Turner (2009) perform a related static welfare analysis in the context of road conges-
tion.
4For a review of the related but distinct literature on the effects of treatment, see Rowthorn and
Toxvaerd (2015).
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Section 6, I discuss the extension to settings with a heterogeneous population. In Section
7, I discuss the main policy recommendations and offer concluding remarks. Appendix
A contains some proofs and an additional online Appendix contains details of omitted
proofs and of illustrative numerical experiments.
2. The Classical and Economic Models
The classical susceptible-infected-susceptible model is simple to describe. Time is con-
tinuous and the horizon is infinite. A population P =[0, 1] consists of a continuum of
infinitely lived individuals who can at each instant t ≥ 0 each be in one of two states,
namely susceptible or infected. The set of infected individuals is denoted by I(t) and
has measure I(t), while the set of susceptible individuals is denoted by S(t) and has
measure S(t). Because the population size is normalized to unity, these measures can be
interpreted as fractions. In what follows, I(t) will be referred to as disease prevalence.
At each instant, the population mixes homogeneously. This corresponds to random
matching, where each individual has an equal chance of meeting any other individual,
irrespective of the health status of the two matched individuals. A match between two
infected individuals or two susceptible individuals does not create any new infection,
but a match between an infected and a susceptible individual may. The rate at which
infection is transferred in such a match is denoted by β > 0. This parameter captures
the infectivity of the disease. Coupled with the assumption of homogeneous mixing,
this means that the aggregate rate at which susceptible individuals become infected is
βI(t)S(t). Thus the rate of new infection, or disease incidence, is proportional to disease
prevalence.5
Infected individuals recover spontaneously at rate α ≥ 0. Thus the aggregate rate at
which infected individuals become susceptible is αI(t). The dynamics of the model are
described by the system of differential equations
Ṡ(t) = I(t) [α− βS(t)] (1)
İ(t) = I(t) [βS(t)− α] (2)
I(t) = 1− S(t), I(0) = I0 (3)
Since the size of the population is normalized to one, this system reduces to the following
logistic growth equation:
İ(t) = I(t) [β(1− I(t))− α] , I(0) = I0 (4)
The steady states of this system are given by




For β > α, the stable steady state is endemic (or persistent), while for β < α, the stable
steady state involves eradication. In the special case α = 0, the unique steady state has
5The term βI(t)S(t) should be thought of as the rate at which susceptible individuals have contact
with other individuals, multiplied by the probability of the contact being with an infectious individual,
multiplied by the probability that the infection is transmitted in such a contact. See e.g. Keeling and
Rohani (2008) for a detailed derivation.
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everyone infected.
At the aggregate level, there is no uncertainty and thus the probability that an ar-
bitrary individual is infected coincides with the fraction of infected individuals. From
the perspective of an infected individual, the transition to susceptibility is governed by
a Poisson process with rate α. Similarly, for a fixed level of aggregate infection I(t), the
transition to infectivity for a susceptible individual is governed by a Poisson process with
rate βI(t). Thus transition probabilities are memoryless, a fact that greatly simplifies
the analysis that follows.
Note that in the classical model, the endemic steady state level of disease prevalence
is decreasing in the recovery rate α and increasing the infectivity rate β. While these
comparative statics are intuitively appealing, it turns out that they are misleading as a
guide for conducting policy.
2.1. Extension to an Economic Model. To turn the classical model into an eco-
nomic model, I will assume that individuals earn a flow payoff πS > 0 per instant while
susceptible, a flow payoff πI < πS per instant while infected and that time is discounted
at rate ρ > 0. For notational simplicity, let π ≡ πS − πI > 0 denote the health premium.
The health premium should be thought of broadly as the benefits of not being infected,
e.g. physical well-being, higher productivity etc.
To model the possibility of engaging in preventive behavior, assume that the individu-
als can affect the rate of infection by controlling the rate at which they expose themselves
to infection. In particular, at each instant t ≥ 0, each susceptible individual i ∈ S(t)
non-cooperatively chooses exposure level εi(t) ∈ [0, 1] at personal cost (1 − εi(t))c ≥ 0.6
Effectively, this reduces the rate of infection to εi(t)βI(t). This formalization captures
the notion that, ceteris paribus, exposure is desirable. Equivalently, this means that en-
gaging in preventive behavior is privately costly. In the absence of infection risk, it would
be optimal to choose full exposure and to not protect oneself.
The assumption of linear costs will greatly simplify the analysis. The main results of
the analysis remain qualitatively unchanged under more general convex cost structures,
but at the expense of considerable analytical complexity and at the loss of closed-form
solutions for steady state values of control and state variables. Throughout, I will state
which main results rely on the linearity assumption.





α + β + ρ
(6)
This assumption imposes an upper bound on the cost of prevention that ensures that
prevention is potentially desirable from the perspective of the individuals.7
6This formulation is equivalent to choosing protection level δ(t) ∈ [0, 1] at cost δ(t)c, which then
yields the infection rate (1− δ(t))βI(t).
7Mathematically, it is a suffi cient condition for the individual decision makers to switch between
exposure and prevention for interior levels of disease prevalence and thus makes the decision non-trivial.
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Assumption 2
α < β (7)
This assumption implies that the eradication steady state of the classical model is
unstable and the relevant steady state is the endemic one. Note that if α > β, then
the infectious disease is eventually eradicated even if no-one engages in any preventive
behavior at all. The only possible role for preventive measures would then be to speed
up the inevitable eradication of the disease.
3. Centralized Decision Making
In this section, I analyze the centralized problem. In this setup, a benevolent utilitarian
social planner seeks to maximize the sum of the individuals’expected, discounted lifetime
utilities through the direct control of aggregate exposure ϕ(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Aggregate exposure
ϕ(t) can alternatively be interpreted as individuals’ average exposure level or as the
fraction of the susceptible population that are fully exposed (with the remainder fully
protected).





e−ρt[I(t)πI + S(t)(πS − (1− ϕ(t))c)]dt (8)
s.t. İ(t) = I(t) [ϕ(t)βS(t)− α] , I(0) = I0 (9)
Ṡ(t) = I(t)[α− ϕ(t)βS(t)], S(0) = 1− I0 (10)
The constraints on the planner’s problem are the laws of motion for the measures of
infected and susceptible individuals, suitably modified to take into account that the rate
at which infection occurs is a function of the centrally chosen aggregate exposure level.
Instead of solving this problem, the following simplified but equivalent programme
will be considered (which differs only by the constant πS in the objective and by using





e−ρt [−I(t)π − (1− I(t))(1− ϕ(t))c] dt (11)
s.t. İ(t) = I(t) [ϕ(t)β(1− I(t))− α] , I(0) = I0 (12)
An admissible policy is a pair of functions (I(t), ϕ(t)) in which for all t ≥ 0, I(t) satisfies
the logistic growth equation (12) and ϕ(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, ϕ(t) must be piecewise
continuous.8 Let λ(t) denote the costate variable, i.e. the shadow price of infection.
The following results characterize the optimal solution under centralized decision mak-
ing:
Theorem 1. (i) The centralized problem has a unique steady state (I∗C , λ
∗
C) and at this
steady state, disease prevalence is interior. The steady state is given by
8The restriction to piece-wise continuous controls is without loss of optimality, since an optimal control








(ii) An optimal path exists and is of the most rapid approach type. It is characterized
by





βπ − (β + ρ)c for I(t) = I
∗
C (14)
ϕ∗C = 1 for I(t) < I
∗
C (15)
Proof: Part (i) follows from the steady state conditions İ(t) = λ̇C(t) = 0, the planner’s
Hamiltonian condition and Assumption 1, which imply that there is a unique singular
control and that this is interior and leads to an interior steady state. In the online
Appendix, it is also proved that any steady state with a non-singular control does not
satisfy the relevant transversality condition. The proof of part (ii) is in Appendix A 
These results have a straightforward intuition. When enough individuals are infected,
the probability that an unprotected individual will become infected is so high that the
marginal cost of prevention is outweighed by the marginal expected welfare loss of ad-
ditional infection. Similarly, when only a few individuals are infected, the probability of
becoming infected is too low to warrant engaging in costly preventive behavior since the
marginal cost of doing so is higher than the marginal social benefits. Thus the optimal
policy always forces disease prevalence towards the interior of its domain.
Because of the bang-bang nature of the optimal policy, this means that whenever
disease prevalence is above the steady state level, the planner optimally reduces exposure
to zero until the steady state level is reached. At this point, the planner switches to
partial exposure so as to maintain the steady state level of disease prevalence. Similarly,
whenever disease prevalence is below the steady state level, the planner optimally chooses
full exposure until disease prevalence has increased to its steady state level, which is
subsequently maintained through partial exposure.
For later comparison, note that the switch in optimal exposure is determined by
necessary Hamiltonian condition for optimality,
λ(t)βI(t) + c = 0 (16)
This condition equalizes the social marginal benefits of exposure with its social marginal
costs.
It is important to emphasize that while the optimal exposure policy is of the bang-
bang type, the main takeaways from the analysis do not depend on this feature. The
important feature of the optimal policy to be noted here is that exposure is monotone
decreasing in the risk faced by the decision maker, which generalizes straightforwardly to
non-linear cost structures.9
9The fact that linearity is not restrictive in this class of models is also found by Goldman and
Lightwood (2002) in a model of treatment. The extension to non-linear convex costs is discussed further
in the online Appendix.
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4. Decentralized Decision Making
In this section, I analyze the decentralized problem. I first analyze the problem of an
individual and then aggregate across the entire population.
From the perspective of an individual, the path of disease prevalence is exogenously
given.10 It will be assumed that each individual has perfect foresight, in the sense that
conjectures about the aggregate evolution of the disease are confirmed in equilibrium.
Let qi(t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that a randomly chosen individual in the






e−ρt [−qi(t)π − (1− qi(t))(1− εi(t))c] dt (17)
s.t. q̇i(t) = εi(t)βI(t)(1− qi(t))− αqi(t), qi(0) ∈ {0, 1} (18)
For an infected individual at instant t ≥ 0, qi(t) = 1 and thus there is no decision to be
made. For a susceptible individual at instant t ≥ 0, qi(t) = 0 and hence the individual
trades off costs and benefits of controlling the rate of transition from S(t) to I(t).
An admissible policy is a pair of functions (qi(t), εi(t)) in which for all t ≥ 0, qi(t)
satisfies the law of motion in (18) and where εi(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, εi(t) must be
piecewise continuous.12 Let µ(t) denote the costate variable, i.e. shadow price of the
probability of being in the infected state.
The above problem is solved for each individual on the background of the aggregate
evolution of the infectious disease, which is, described by the following modified logistic
growth equation:




In this equation, ε(t) denotes the aggregate level of exposure resulting from the susceptible
individuals’disaggregate exposure levels. Because the aggregate exposure is normalized
by the measure of susceptible individuals S(t), ε(t) can be interpreted as a fraction. Note
that in contrast to the case of central planning, aggregate infection I(t) is not directly
chosen, but is rather the outcome of decentralized decisions by individuals.
The following result characterizes equilibrium under decentralized decision making:
Theorem 2. (i) The decentralized problem has a unique steady state (I∗D, µ
∗
D) and at







10Because each agent is negligible and does not influence the aggregate, any feedback between an
individual’s action and other individuals’responses is ignored by the individual.
11For the detailed steps leading to this formulation, see the online Appendix.
12The restriction to piece-wise continuous controls is without loss of optimality as best response control
exists within this class.
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(ii) In the unique decentralized equilibrium, for all times t ≥ 0 and individuals i ∈
S(t), equilibrium strategies are given by





βπ − c(α + β + ρ) for I(t) = I
∗
D (21)
ε∗i = 1 for I(t) < I
∗
D (22)
Proof: Part (i) follows from the steady state conditions İ(t) = q̇(t) = µ̇D(t) = 0, the
individual’s Hamiltonian condition and Assumption 1, which show that there is a unique
singular control for the individual’s problem and that this is interior and leads to an
interior steady state. In the online Appendix, it is also proved that any steady state with
a non-singular control does not satisfy the relevant transversality condition. The proof
of part (ii) is in Appendix A 
Akin to the optimal policy in the centralized setup, in the decentralized equilibrium
individuals play pure strategies outside of steady state in order to approach the singular
solution as rapidly as possible. Once there, in the symmetric equilibrium the individuals
switch to mixed strategies to maintain the steady state level of disease prevalence. The
proof follows similar steps as those in the centralized setup.
The switch in privately optimal exposure is determined by necessary Hamiltonian
condition for optimality:
µ(t)βI(t) + c = 0 (23)
This condition equalizes the private marginal benefits of exposure with its private mar-
ginal costs.
For reasons that parallel those in the centralized setup, the steady state is necessarily
interior under decentralization. But because individuals do not internalize the effects
that their preventive behavior has on other individuals and because each individual has
a negligible effect on the aggregate, the centralized and aggregate decentralized steady
state policies and disease prevalences differ. To better understand these differences, it is
worthwhile briefly discussing the nature of externalities in the model.
First, along a path to steady state, all individuals either fully expose or fully protect
themselves irrespective of what others do. Once in steady state, in a symmetric equi-
librium all susceptible individuals mix between protection and exposure to maintain a
constant level of disease prevalence. This means that away from steady state, there is no
strategic interaction, while once at steady state, protection decisions are strategic substi-
tutes. The former result stems from the linearity of costs which yields bang-bang policies.
With more general convex cost structures, strategic substitutability would obtain also on
transition paths and not only at steady state.
Second, as will be explored further below, individuals expose themselves too much
from a social welfare perspective. The discrepancy between socially optimal and equi-
librium exposure has two sources. On one hand, individuals do not internalize the fact
that their exposure decisions influence the wellbeing of other individuals. This is a classic
instance of an uninternalized negative externality, which causes individuals to overexpose
themselves. On the other hand, the contemporaneous external effects just described has
additional intertemporal effects. The reason is that individuals at each moment face an
intertemporal tradeoff that weighs costs of protection against the benefits from exposure.
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Steady State Exposure Steady State Prevalence Steady State Welfare













α + + 0 + + 0
β − − − − + for ρ > α +
π − − − − 0 0
c + + + + − −
ρ + + + + − −
Table 1: Steady state values and comparative statics results. A ( + ) indicates that the
steady state value is increasing in the variable in the first column, while a ( - ) indicates
that it is decreasing.
This tradeoff is a function of the level of disease prevalence in the population, to wit
on the entire future path of infection. Since exposure decisions under decentralized de-
cision making are suboptimally high, the future equilibrium path of infection is strictly
higher than that induced under centralized decision making. This means that from the
perspective of an individual, the future path of infection is different from that facing the
central planner and this discrepancy makes their tradeoffs different, even controlling for
the contemporaneous external effects. Higher future disease prevalence means that the
individuals will find it optimal to engage in lower future exposure, somewhat offsetting
the direct contemporaneous external effect. The intertemporal effects of the externality
are due to the fact that each individual is numerically insignificant and therefore takes the
future path of infection as given, in contrast to the central planner who directly controls
this path. For further analysis of these issues, including a formal decomposition of such
effects, see the online Appendix and Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2015).
5. Welfare, Policy and Rational Disinhibition
In this section, I consider two specific second-best policy measures, namely medical inter-
ventions that (i) permanently alter the infectiousness of the disease and (ii) permanently
alter the rate of recovery from infection.
For ease of reference, the steady state values and the comparative statics results for
the centralized and decentralized settings are summarized in Table 1.
Direct inspection shows that the steady state value of prevalence under centralized
decision making is interior. It follows that in this model, it is never optimal to eradicate
the disease through moment-by-moment protection. This should be contrasted to the
possible desirability of eradicating the disease though other means, such as vaccination
or treatment.13
Second, direct comparison of the steady state values confirms that when α > 0,
individuals value protection less than the social planner does. Since prevention is valued
less by individuals than by the social planner, the former will tend to choose higher
exposure than the level preferred by the latter, which will in turn lead to higher disease
13Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2015) show that a policy that involves eradication does not satisfy the
relevant transversality condition. Furthermore, they show that with suffi ciently ineffective prevention,
there may be steady states in which full prevention is optimal. But under such scenarios, the disease is
never eradicated.
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prevalence and to lower steady state flow welfare.
5.1. Interventions that Influence Infectiousness. Next, I will analyze the effects
and desirability of permanently changing the infectiousness of the disease. Before doing
so, there are a number of common (and somewhat overlapping) misconceptions that must
be addressed.
The first mistake, which is now recognized by some in both the policy and the acad-
emic communities, is the failure to explicitly account for behavioral responses to changes
in biomedical or economic parameters. A policy based on the classical epidemiological
propagation equation, which ignores behavioral responses, would recommend a decrease
in β in order to decrease disease incidence. But the comparative statics of the classical
model are inadequate for policy analysis as they take individuals’behavior as given and
fixed. As is clear from the present analysis, any decision maker that trades off costs
and benefits of exposure will respond to changes in infectivity β. Thus the mechanistic
disease accounting inherent in the classical approach is inappropriate for policy analysis.
In short, while decreasing infectivity β indeed reduces overall disease incidence, given
exposure levels, these in turn increase in response to the decrease in infectivity and thus
cannot be taken as given.
The second mistake, which is still ubiquitous in the policy debate on pre-exposure
prophylaxis, is to confound statements about the presence of behavioral disinhibition
with statements about the desirability of interventions that reduce risk. That is, it is
common to see judgements about social welfare based solely on the presence (or lack of)
disinhibition.14 As shown here, such a conclusion is unwarranted, simply because both
the central planner and the individuals respond to decreased infectivity by increasing the
exposure to infection. Thus the presence (or lack of) disinhibition is not an appropriate
yardstick with which to measure changes in social welfare.
Rather than lumping the response of the social planner and that of the individuals
into the common category “behavioral disinhibition”as is commonly done, it is useful to
distinguish between optimal disinhibition (exhibited by the central planner) and rational
disinhibition (exhibited by individuals). The latter is rational in the sense that it is
consistent with individual discounted expected utility maximization. With these concepts
in place, it follows that behavioral disinhibition should in general be expected, but that
it need not in itself be a cause for concern.15
The third common mistake is the failure to identify the source of potential gains
from permanently reducing infectivity. In the present model, the welfare gains flowing
from a permanent decrease in infectivity stem from the benefits of increased exposure,
rather than from permanently lower steady state disease prevalence. In other words, if a
decrease in infectivity increases overall welfare, it is because on the path towards the new
and higher steady state, individuals fully expose themselves to infection. It is precisely
the welfare gains associated with the higher exposure levels on the transition path that
account for the overall increase in welfare. In short, welfare is increased despite the fact
that it leads to higher levels of infection.
14See e.g. Abbas et al. (2007), Over (2008), Over et al. (2004) and Szekeres et al. (2004).
15Risk compensation is documented by Cohen et al. (2009), Paltiel et al. (2009) and Crepaz et al.
(2004). See also discussions in Philipson and Posner (1993), Szekeres et al. (2004) and Blower et al.
(2000).
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Next, I formalize the above observations by considering the following thought experi-
ment. Suppose as a benchmark that the initial infectivity parameter is given by a baseline
value β1, which leads to an associated steady state prevalence level I1 ≡ I∗D(β1) under
decentralized decision making. Assume that the system has reached this steady state.
Next, consider an exogenous, costless and permanent reduction of infectiousness to some
lower rate β2 < β1 and denote by I2 ≡ I∗D(β2) the associated steady state prevalence
level.
To evaluate the welfare consequences of reducing infectivity β in this way, I compare
the discounted social values of (i) staying indefinitely at steady state I1 under infectivity
β1 and (ii) taking the path that moves the system from the old steady state I1 to the new
steady state I2 and stays there indefinitely, the latter path calculated under infectivity
β2.
It follows from the comparative statics results in Table 1 that I2 > I1 and the as-
sociated steady state welfare levels are such that WD(β2) < WD(β1). In other words,
under decentralized decision making, a reduction in infectivity increases both equilib-
rium steady state exposure and disease prevalence, leading to a decrease in steady state
social welfare.16 If the discounted social welfare associated with option (i) is higher than
the discounted social welfare of option (ii), then reducing infectivity is not a welfare
enhancing policy and there is immiserization.
Let V (I, I ′; β) denote the discounted social value of following the most rapid approach
path that starts at steady state I and ends (and stays perpetually) at steady state I ′,
under infectivity β. With this notation, there is immiserization of the population if for
some values (β1, β2) with β2 < β1 it is the case that
V (I1, I2; β2) < V (I1, I1; β1) (24)
where the latter term is simply the discounted social welfare of staying indefinitely at
steady state I1.
Turning to the social planner, let I∗1 ≡ I∗C(β1) and I∗2 ≡ I∗C(β2) denote the end points
of the optimal paths under centralized decision making under the two infectivity levels
being considered. Because the planner can directly control the path of aggregate disease
prevalence, it can ensure itself at least the value V (I∗1 , I
∗
1 ; β2), i.e. the value of staying
forever at the original steady state, but calculated using the lower infectivity rate β2. By
re-optimizing over possible paths, it will typically do even better. In other words, the
following result holds:
Theorem 3. Under centralized decision making,
V (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ; β2) ≥ V (I∗1 , I∗1 ; β2) > V (I∗1 , I∗1 ; β1) (25)
In summary, a planner that permanently decreases infectivity and optimally steers
disease prevalence from some steady state I∗1 to I
∗
2 necessarily increases overall discounted
social welfare. This is in contrast to the situation under decentralized decision making,
16Gersovitz (2010) states that “A suffi cient condition for an improvement in welfare caused by a change
that is a technological improvement (one that increases welfare in the social planner’s problem) is [..]
that the rate of infection fall in the long-run steady state”. As seen above, this condition is never satisfied
in the present model and thus has no bite, i.e. immiserization cannot be ruled out.
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Status Quo Intervention Status Quo Intervention
Dec. I1 = 0.001871 I2 = 0.002041 V (I1, I1; β1) = −0.916667 V (I1, I2; β2) = −0.917353
Cen. I∗1 = 0.000187 I
∗




1 , β1) = −0.766667 V (I∗1 , I∗2 ; β2) = −0.754725
Table 2: Example of immiserization.
where the reduction in infectivity causes a shift from steady state I1 to I2. From a social
perspective, neither steady state I1 nor I2 is the end point of an optimal path. Thus
the reduction in infectivity involves moving from one socially suboptimal steady state to
another socially suboptimal steady state. There is therefore no reason to expect such a
transition to be welfare enhancing in general.
For a concrete example of how welfare losses can result from a permanent lowering of
the infectiousness of the disease, consider a reduction from β1 = 6 to β2 = 5.5 with the
other parameters given by α = 1, ρ = 0.11, c = 0.1 and π = 10. Under centralized decision
making, this reduction of infectiousness takes the system from steady state prevalence
I∗1 = 0.000187 to I
∗
2 = 0.000204, in the process increasing discounted social welfare
from V (I∗1 , I
∗
1 , β1) = −0.766667 to V (I∗1 , I∗2 ; β2) = −0.754725. Turning to decentralized
decision making, the same reduction in infectiousness takes the system from steady state
disease prevalence I1 = 0.001871 to I2 = 0.002041. In contrast to the the situation under
central planning, under decentralized decision making this reduction in infectiousness
decreases discounted social welfare, from V (I1, I1; β1) = −0.916667 to V (I1, I2; β2) =
−0.917353. For ease of comparison, I summarize these numbers in Table 2.
Although WD(β1) > WD(β2), so the decrease in infectiousness decreases steady state
welfare under decentralized decision making,WC(β1) < WC(β2) for this parameterization
(since α = 1 > 0.11 = ρ). This means that under centralized decision making, there is no
tradeoffbetween gains on the transition path and losses from being in a new steady state;
both contribute towards increased social welfare. Under decentralized decision making
though, the new steady state is indeed worse and in this case the decrease in discounted
steady state welfare dominates the benefits of increased exposure on the transition path.
For completeness, it should be emphasized that the criterion used to detect welfare
improvements used in this thought experiment is very strict, because it assumes that
infectivity can be reduced at no cost. Clearly, introducing the more realistic assumption
that reducing infectivity is in fact costly would only further reduce the desirability of the
policy in question.
It follows from this example that although reducing the infectiousness of a disease
permanently has strong intuitive appeal, a more careful analysis is warranted. Such an
analysis shows that the policy may lead to immiserization and therefore be counterpro-
ductive and negate the intended policy aim.
In the online Appendix, I outline results from more extensive numerical analysis.
The main points of this analysis are that (i) immiserization can indeed occur for a wide
set of parameter values, (ii) immiserization typically emerges for moderate decreases in
infectiousness but not for very significant decreases and (iii) the presence and severity
of immiserization depends on all the parameters of the model but the dependence is
fairly complicated as the entire paths depend on these. Baseline infectiousness and the
recovery rate tend to be particularly influential in determining the presence and severity
of immiserization.
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5.2. Interventions that Influence Recovery. Next, I turn to the effects of per-
manently increasing the recovery rate α. It can be verified from direct inspection of
the steady state values that for the special case α = 0, the equilibrium outcome under
decentralized decision making coincides with that chosen by the central planner. The
reason that the decentralized equilibrium is socially optimal when α = 0 is that that in
a symmetric setting with bang-bang policies, all individuals switch from full exposure to
full (and perfect) protection at the same threshold level of disease prevalence. But this
means that when individuals choose to protect themselves, so do all others and there are
thus no susceptible individuals left in the population that can suffer from the negative
externalities.17
From the results reported in Table 1, one readily concludes that increasing the recovery
rate must increase social welfare and cannot result in immiserization.18 To see this, note
that under both centralized and decentralized decision making, an increase in the recovery
rate α leads to an unambiguous increase in steady state exposure and on the path to the
new steady state, there is full exposure. So on this count, the change in α increases
welfare. In addition, steady state welfare is itself non-decreasing in the recovery rate α
(and in the case of centralized decision making, strictly increasing). Thus there is no
welfare tradeoff from such an increase in the recovery rate and it therefore cannot lead
to immiserization.
Another issue that should be noted is that in practice, increasing the recovery rate
is likely achieved by increasing either the quality or the extent of treatment of infected
individuals (that is, if treatment is feasible). But if treatment is feasible and chosen
optimally, then the analysis in the present paper no longer applies and more complicated
policies must be considered. Once prevention and treatment are chosen in conjunction,
the dynamics of the model become very complicated and there may be multiple steady
states across which the comparative statics results vary (see Rowthorn and Toxvaerd,
2015 for details). Furthermore, if treatment is available and optimally chosen, then the
optimal level of prevention may no longer correspond to the level derived here. Still,
increasing α can be interpreted as an innovation in therapeutic interventions in a world
in which a policy of complete and permanent treatment of infected individuals is in place
for unmodeled reasons.
6. Extensions to a Heterogeneous Population
The analysis above was conducted under the assumption of homogeneity, both in terms
of payoffs and in terms of susceptibility to infection. The first type of homogeneity is that
all individuals face identical costs of protection and infection. The second type of homo-
geneity is concerned with the contact pattern and, implicitly, the degree of susceptibility
to infection. For both types of homogeneity, it is of some interest to consider what might
be learned by relaxing the maintained assumptions.19
First, assume that rather than individuals having identical costs of protection, their
costs are drawn from a distribution F on some interval [c, c]. Note that in this setting,
17These issues are discussed further in the online Appendix and in Chen and Toxvaerd (2014).
18So while decreasing α would indeed narrow the gap between social welfare under centralized and
decentralized decision making, the level of the latter would also be decreased, making such a policy
undesirable.
19Preciado et al. (2014) consider both types of heterogeneity, but their analysis is orthogonal to the
present work as they do not consider social welfare or utility maximization.
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the best responses of individuals are analogous to those in the homogeneous setting,
but with each agent having a different tolerance to infection risk. For example, for an
individual i ∈ S(t), the infection level that determines the switch from full exposure
to full protection will be a function of the idiosyncratic cost parameter ci, given by the
Hamiltonian condition
µ(t)βI(t) + ci = 0 (26)
For a given set of parameters characterizing the individual and a given level of aggregate
disease prevalence, this condition pins down individual behavior.
Next, I will describe the features of the steady state heuristically. Because each cost
level ci implicitly defines a critical threshold of aggregate infection Ii(t) that causes the
individual to switch between exposure and non-exposure. Then for a given level of disease
prevalence I(t) one can determine which individuals choose not to expose themselves at
that level. Consider a steady state I∗ in this setting. Because the willingness of individual
i ∈ S(t) to expose itself is increasing in its cost ci, the steady state I∗ of aggregate disease
prevalence will have an associated threshold cost c∗ ∈ [c, c] such that all individuals with
costs c < c∗ choose no exposure in steady state. The situation facing the remaining
individuals, who all have costs c ≥ c∗, resembles that under homogeneous costs. In
particular, in steady state, all such high cost individuals will mix between full protection
and full exposure, but will do so with different mixing probabilities. Since an individual
must be indifferent between its strategies in order to be willing to mix and they all face
the same infection risk, it must be the case that high cost individuals expose themselves
with higher probability. Thus in such a steady state, the proportion F (c∗) of lowest cost
individuals choose full protection while the remainder (1 − F (c∗)) choose to randomize
over their exposure decisions. In conclusion, in such a steady state (I∗, c∗), a fraction of
the population protect themselves at all times and are never infected, while the remainder
of the population never protect themselves fully and cycle perpetually between recovery
and infection.20 Now consider an exogenous decrease in the infectiousness parameter
β. Such a change will shift the location of the cutoff individual c∗ and of steady state
prevalence I∗ upwards and prompt both an increase in set of individuals that expose
themselves and to an increase in the levels of exposure by each individual.
For the second type of heterogeneity, consider a model in which individuals differ in
terms of infection risk, such as in the work of Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2001),
Jackson and Rogers (2007) and Lopez-Pintado (2008). Specifically, assume that an in-
dividual i ∈ S(t) is characterized by its in-degree (or connectivity) di > 0, interpreted
as the number of contacts that the individual has per instant. Assume that individu-
als’degrees are exogenously given and characterized by the population-wide distribution
P (d). Denoting by ρd(t) the probability that an individual with degree d is infected, a






The probability θ(t) can be thought of as the per-degree infection probability for a sus-
20Note that in a setting with increasing convex costs of abstinence, a similar feature will be present.
Higher cost individuals will expose themselves more and consequently constitute a higher proportion of
the class of infected individuals (relative to their weight in the population).
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ceptible individual. Using a mean-field approximation, the Hamiltonian condition for an
individual of degree di is then
µ(t)βθ(t)di + c = 0 (28)
It follows that the product θ(t)di plays the exact same role as aggregate prevalence I(t)
plays in the case of homogeneous mixing.21 From the perspective of the individual, the
degree-weighted infection risk per degree θ(t) is exogenous and the same across individ-
uals. The best responses of individuals, in this heterogeneous susceptibility/connectivity
setting has the same character as that described in the main analysis of this paper. That
is, the propensity to expose oneself is decreasing in the incoming risk of infection as cap-
tured by the individual’s degree. To be specific, higher degree individuals face higher
risks and will therefore counteract this higher infection risk by curtailing their exposure
more.
Heuristically, a steady state in this setting consists of a pair (θ∗, d∗) such that all
individuals with degrees larger than d∗ will fully protect themselves. Individuals with
degrees smaller than d∗ will choose to mix between full exposure and full prevention,
with higher degree individuals choosing exposure with lower probability. The steady state
per-degree risk θ∗ will then be the degree-weighted steady state infection probabilities of
the individuals in the population, i.e. ρ∗d. Again, an exogenous decrease in the infectivity
parameter β will cause an upward shift in exposure levels and the resulting per-degree
risk θ∗, as well as in disease prevalence.
In summary, both types of heterogeneity give rise to best responses that are qual-
itatively similar to those in the homogeneous setting. Having said that, equilibrium
outcomes and steady states are considerably more involved in these cases. The nature of
externalities under heterogeneity may be more complicated than under homogeneity and
thus may influence both equilibrium outcomes and policy analysis.
7. Discussion and Policy Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze a simple model of disease propagation in which individuals may
engage in privately costly preventive behavior (but cannot control their rate of recovery).
I analyze the outcomes under both centralized decision making by a benevolent social
planner and under decentralized decision making by non-cooperative, forward-looking in-
dividuals. I find that in the decentralized equilibrium, individuals over-expose themselves
to infection compared to the socially optimal level and that this leads to socially subop-
timal steady state disease prevalence and welfare levels. This is a result of the fact that
individuals do not internalize the external effects of their private prevention decisions and
because each have negligible effects on aggregate disease dynamics.
Next, I consider the desirability of different second-best policy measures aimed at
reducing the wedge between private and public incentives to engage in prevention, such as
permanently reducing the infectiousness of the disease through pre-exposure prophylaxis.
I show that such a policy intervention may actually reduce overall discounted social
welfare. This stems from the presence of behavioral disinhibition, which means that
decision makers respond to lower infectiousness by increasing their exposure to infection.
When considering such policies, the policy maker would therefore do well to keep in mind
the maxim “First, do no harm”. Encapsulating a central concept in medical ethics, the
21Note that the assumption of homogeneous mixing in the homogeneous setting amounts to a mean-
field approximation.
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advice reminds the physician that interventions have both costs and benefits and that
inactivity may be preferable to prescribing a course of action that does more harm than
good. In this work, I explicitly show that for some parameter ranges, immiserization may
well be the consequence of permanently reducing the disease’s infectiousness. This calls
for careful analysis before the introduction of such second-best policy interventions.
There are a number of policy conclusions that emerge from this analysis. The first
conclusion is that a seemingly sensible policy such as decreasing the infectivity of a
disease can lead to immiserization, i.e. to a decrease in overall welfare. This stems from
a combination of (i) disinhibition and (ii) external effects due to self-interested behavior.
This means in particular that before introducing such policies, policy makers would be
well-advised to carefully consider the overall effects that may be induced and not simply
rely on intuition.
The second conclusion is that when a policy such as pre-exposure prophylaxis is indeed
welfare enhancing, it is precisely because it allows individuals to benefit more from the
exposure that they find desirable. These benefits will counterweight the subsequent
decrease in steady state welfare that results from the intervention. In fact, with an overly
paternalistic approach to policy making that ignores the benefits of exposure, there would
never be any grounds for decreasing infectivity in the first place, even if all individuals
were to perfectly conform to the behavior mandated by the social planner.
Last, it should be emphasized that the policies considered in this paper are second-
best in nature. It is possible to achieve socially better outcomes by the introduction of
carefully tailored fines and subsidies, as shown in Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2015). Having
said that, first-best policies of this kind are typically very complicated objects and may
thus be non-trivial to implement.
Appendix
A. Proofs that Optimal Policies Exist and are of the MRAP Type
A.1. The Centralized Setting. This appendix confirms that the conditions of Sethi
(1977), Theorem 3.1 (i)-(vi) are satisfied for the centralized and decentralized problems
respectively. I start with the former of these. From the logistic growth equation, solve














































+ (π − c) (33)
First, note that I(t) = I∗C is the unique solution to the equation
∆C(I(t)) = 0 (34)
Next, given I(t) = I∗C , ϕ(t) = ϕ
∗
C is the unique solution to the equation
İ(t) = 0 (35)
Last, it is easy to verify that ∆C(I(t)) > 0 for I(t) > I∗C while ∆
C(I(t)) < 0 for I(t) < I∗C .
This proves that conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied. Conditions (iv)-(vi) hold trivially 
A.2. The Decentralized Setting. Turning to the decentralized problem, solve the
differential equation governing the probability of being infected for the individual expo-

















































+ (π − c) (40)
Here, I have made the substitution qi(t) = I(t). It is easily verified that I(t) = I∗D is the
unique solution to the equation
∆D(I(t)) = 0 (41)
Given qi(t) = I(t) = I∗D, εi(t) = ε
∗
D is the unique solution to the equation
q̇i(t) = 0 (42)
The last step is to note that ∆D(I(t)) > 0 for I(t) > I∗D while ∆
D(I(t)) < 0 for I(t) < I∗D.
Conditions (iv)-(vi) hold trivially. This completes the proof 
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